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Models of monetary policy incorporating imperfectly competitive labour markets predict
that in￿ ation increases with the gap between actual real wages and their competitive levels.
We use panel data to test for a link between in￿ ation and the labour market characteristics
that in￿ uence wage gaps. We also test for e⁄ects from central bank independence, trade
openness and income per capita. Trade union membership rates, employment protection
and coordination in wage bargaining are signi￿cant. Central bank independence, trade
openness and income per capita do not explain temporal variation in in￿ ation directly, but
do a⁄ect the impact of labour market characteristics on in￿ ation.
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1 Introduction
Explaining di⁄erences in in￿ ation across macroeconomic regimes has become an important re-
search topic in monetary economics. Theoretical models of the sort proposed by Barro and
Gordon (1983) predict that equilibrium, or time consistent, in￿ ation is a function of those
factors determining a policy-maker￿ s degree of in￿ ation aversion. These include the conserva-
tiveness of the central bank (Rogo⁄ (1985)) and openness to international trade (Romer (1993),
Lane (1997)).
The recent contributions to this literature emphasise the importance of labour market insti-
tutions. Cukierman and Lippi (1999), hereafter CL, consider a two-stage game featuring trade
unions and a central bank. The key result is that trade unions set real wages in excess of the
competitive level and that it is optimal for the central bank to partially accommodate this real
wage premium when setting in￿ ation. CL argue that trade union centralisation (the inverse of
the number of unions) is the main determinant of the real wage premium and hence in￿ ation,
but it is clear that other factors such as the percentage unionisation rate of the workforce, the
1substitutability of employed and unemployed labour and the degree of coordination between
￿rms and unions could also play a role.
Empirical evidence on the predictions made by these models has been presented in a number
of papers published since the start of the 1990s. Cukierman (1992) identi￿es a robust link
between measures of central bank independence (CBI) and in￿ ation. Romer (1993) estimates
a negative correlation between trade openness and in￿ ation, and CL provide evidence on the
relationship between trade union centralisation and in￿ ation. These ￿ndings are obtained either
from cross-country regressions or from pooled OECD time series regressions that do not control
for country ￿xed e⁄ects. This means that the results may be driven by some time invariant
factor that is omitted from the analysis, but which happens to be correlated with the variables
of interest.
In this paper we construct a panel dataset for 20 OECD countries covering the period 1961-
95. The dataset comprises a range of labour market indicators such as unionisation rates,
measures of coordination in wage bargaining and the strictness of employment protection, as
well as the variables emphasised in earlier contributions such as central bank independence,
trade openness and per capita income. Each variable is time-varying. Using this dataset we
investigate the determinants of in￿ ation after controlling for country ￿xed e⁄ects, common time
e⁄ects and lagged in￿ ation. A second contribution of the paper is that we test for a range of
interactions between labour market institutions, CBI, trade openness and income per capita.
The results point to a number of interesting conclusions. First, CBI, trade openness and
income per capita are all negatively associated with in￿ ation in regressions that exclude ￿xed
e⁄ects, but each e⁄ect loses signi￿cance when the models control for ￿xed e⁄ects. Second, the
percentage unionisation of the workforce exerts a positive and robust e⁄ect on in￿ ation. Third,
the positive impact of unionisation on in￿ ation is larger when levels of employment protection are
above the sample average and smaller when employment protection is below the sample average.
Fourth, although CBI, trade openness and per capita income are insigni￿cant when entered as
level e⁄ects, they do form signi￿cant interactions with the unionisation rate. Speci￿cally, the
trade union density e⁄ect is less strong when income per capita and CBI are above the OECD
average, and, in the case of relatively open economies, when the level of coordination between
trade unions and ￿rms is above the OECD average. Finally, we show that the impact of oil
price shocks on in￿ ation varies with the structure of labour market institutions. These ￿ndings
are, for the most part, robust to controlling for reverse causation bias and to varying the sample
used for estimation.
The remainder of the paper expands upon these points and is structured as follows. Section
2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on in￿ ation performance in OECD countries.
Section 3 describes the panel dataset that we construct and discusses econometric methodology.
Section 4 reports our empirical results and section 5 summarises the paper.
2 Models of in￿ ation performance
The main theoretical results arising from the modern approach to explaining in￿ ation can be
illustrated using a stripped down version of the model in CL, which extends the well known
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central bank and trade unions. In the second stage the central bank chooses in￿ ation taking
the nominal wages previously set by unions as given. In the ￿rst stage each union chooses a
nominal wage rate taking the nominal wage rates chosen by all other unions and the subsequent
central bank reaction as given. Trade unions derive positive utility from high real wages, but
dislike unemployment and in￿ ation, such that their loss function can be written as:
￿j = ￿2wr j + Au2
j + B￿2 (1)
where uj is the rate of unemployment among members of union j, ￿ = p ￿ p￿1 is the rate
of in￿ ation (the ￿rst di⁄erence of the log price level) and A and B are positive parameters.
The central bank is averse to volatility in unemployment and in￿ ation about their target values
(which are normalised to zero) and thus tries to minimise the following loss function:
￿ = u2 + I￿2 (2)
where I measures the relative in￿ ation aversion of the central bank.
The aggregate labour demand equation in the economy is given by
Ld = ￿(d ￿ wr)L (3)
where Ld denotes labour demanded, wr is the log of the average real wage, L is the total
supply of labour and ￿ and d are parameters. CL note that this can be reformulated as the
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where w is the average nominal wage, p￿1, is the log of the previous period price level and
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If (5) is rewritten after splitting the nominal wage into its real and expected price level
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which says that the central bank partially accommodates the expected rate of in￿ ation, E￿,
and what CL term the ￿ real wage premium￿ , ￿, which is the excess of the equilibrium real wage
over the competitive (full employment) level. Imposing the rational expectations condition that





3Equation (7) illustrates the well known result that in￿ ation exceeds the socially optimal level
(of zero) when real wage rigidities prevent employment from reaching the competitive level. The
intuition for this is that if private in￿ ation expectations were equal to zero the policy-maker
would have an incentive to ￿ cheat￿on those expectations through moving the economy along the
short-run unemployment-in￿ ation trade-o⁄ in (4) to a point at which there is positive in￿ ation
and lower unemployment. This is welfare improving in the short-term because the policy-maker
has convex preferences over low in￿ ation and low unemployment and therefore bene￿ts from
trading one o⁄ against the other. The private sector anticipates this move and therefore sets
in￿ ation as in (7), at which point in￿ ation is su¢ ciently high to deter further episodes of surprise
in￿ ation.
The expression in (7) can be used to elucidate a number of arguments that have been put
forward in order to explain in￿ ation. These theories can be divided into three groups: those
relating to the preferences of the policy-maker, those that focus on labour market institutions
and those that look at interactions between preferences and institutions. We summarise these
arguments below and indicate in brackets the sign of the predicted e⁄ect.
The determinants of in￿ ation preferences
￿ The degree of central bank independence (-ve).
In the models due to Barro and Gordon (1983) and Rogo⁄ (1985) it is implicitly assumed
that the real wage premium is constant so that there is a ￿xed distance between equilibrium
levels of employment/output and the socially optimal level. It then follows that in￿ ation will be
inversely related to the in￿ ation aversion parameter, I. Assuming that a committee of central
bankers is more in￿ ation averse than an elected government, it follows that greater central bank
independence (CBI) in the conduct of monetary policy will lead to lower in￿ ation.
￿ Openness to international trade (-ve).
Lane (1997) presents a model in which a wedge between equilibrium and socially optimal
employment exists in the non-traded sector of the economy but not the traded sector. In terms
of the CL framework this is equivalent to there being a real wage premium in the non-traded
sector but not the traded sector (more generally, the ￿ parameter is smaller in the traded sector
than the non-traded sector). One rationale for this is that the traded sector is more competitive.
In this set-up a policy authority will only have an incentive to implement surprise in￿ ation in
the non-traded sector (assuming an initial in￿ ation rate of zero), and as this sector is smaller in
a more open economy the overall incentive to launch in￿ ation surprises will be weaker and the
equilibrium in￿ ation rate lower.1
￿ GDP per capita (-ve).
The in￿ ation aversion parameter, I, may be related to income per capita if low in￿ ation is
considered a normal good. This relationship is not set out in a speci￿c model, but is often cited
in empirical studies of in￿ ation performance, see Campillo and Miron (1997).
1Romer (1993) derives the result that in￿ ation is negatively related to openness using a model in which terms
of trade adjustments decrease the net marginal bene￿t of surprise monetary expansions. The logic of this model
is more di¢ cult to illustrate in the framework used here, however.
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Recent research due to Nunziata (2004) shows that real wages in OECD countries depend
on labour market institutions. The solution for in￿ ation in (7) suggests that these institutional
variables will also a⁄ect in￿ ation. The key labour market characteristics emphasised by Nunziata
are as follows:
￿ The percentage unionisation rate of the workforce (+ve).
As unionisation rates increase, the substitutability of union labour and non-union labour
decreases, which strengthens the bargaining position of trade unions such that they can elicit a
larger real wage premium. This leads to higher equilibrium in￿ ation.
￿ The degree of trade union centralisation/coordination (+ve/-ve).
The degree of centralisation in the trade union sector is the inverse of the number of unions,
see CL (1999). This is closely related to the level of coordination between trade unions and
￿rms in the wage bargaining process because greater centralisation facilitates coordination. CL
predict a hump shaped relation between centralisation and the real wage premium/in￿ ation.
The reason for this is that increasing the average size of a union exerts two e⁄ects on union
behaviour. First, increased monopoly power in labour supply raises the real wage premium
that a union can extract. Second, as unions increase in size the macroeconomic consequences
of their wage decisions become more visible. When a small union increases its nominal wage
demand there is only an in￿nitesimal aggregate price change so that the result is a higher real
wage without higher in￿ ation, whilst when a large union increases its nominal wage demand
the overall price level increases, such that in￿ ation rises and the real wage increase is moderate.
This reduces the incentive for trade unions to push for higher real wages. At low levels of
trade union centralisation the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates, meaning that the wage premium rises and
in￿ ation increases, whilst after a certain point the second e⁄ect dominates and in￿ ation falls.
This argument is close to that of Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988).
￿ The strictness of employment protection legislation (+ve).
An increase in the strictness of employment protection legislation ensures that it is less easy
to substitute labour that is currently employed for outside labour, and this will increase the real
wage premium that can be earned by those currently in employment.
Interaction e⁄ects
The literature points to a large number of interaction e⁄ects in the determination of in￿ ation.
These can be summarised as follows:
￿ Interactions between labour market institutions.
In￿ ation may depend on the interaction between labour market institutions. We hypothesise
that unionisation rates will exert a larger impact on in￿ ation when employment protection is
relatively strict, but will exert a smaller impact on in￿ ation rates when wage bargaining is
relatively centralised/coordinated.
￿ Interactions between labour market institutions and indicators of in￿ation aversion.
Soskice and Iversen (1998) contend that trade unions will be deterred from setting a large
real wage premium if central bank independence is high because trade unions anticipate that
the central bank will respond to a large real wage premium through implementing a very tough
5monetary policy. The success of the Bundesbank in ￿ disciplining￿German trade unions is one
example of this interaction.
CL highlight a mechanism through which central bank independence may amplify rather
than restrict the in￿ ation increasing e⁄ect of trade union power. It is shown that the critical
level of union centralisation at which the hump reaches a peak depends upon the level of central
bank independence. The more independent the central bank the higher the level of union
centralisation at which the turning point occurs, i.e. the greater the range of centralisation
levels over which in￿ ation will be an increasing function of union centralisation. The intuition
for this is that high levels of CBI ensure that in￿ ation is held low when a trade union increases its
nominal wage demand. This allows each union greater ￿ exibility in trading o⁄ employment and
real wages (because higher nominal wages are less likely to be cancelled out by high in￿ ation).
To the extent that unions target higher real wages, equilibrium in￿ ation will rise.
2.1 The empirical evidence
A large number of papers provide empirical evidence on the determinants of in￿ ation. The main
tools used in these studies are either cross-country regressions or pooled time series regressions
that do not control for country ￿xed e⁄ects, i.e. the information used to test the theoretical
predictions is mainly based upon di⁄erences between countries, rather than changes within
countries over time. Examples of these studies include Cukierman (1992), who shows that
in￿ ation is negatively related to a measure of the legal independence of central banks and
Romer (1993), who shows that average in￿ ation over the period 1973-89 is negatively related to
both openness to trade (measured as the share of imports in GDP) and real per capita income,
both averaged over the period 1973-89.2
CL provide preliminary evidence on the relationship between labour market institutions and
in￿ ation. Average in￿ ation rates over 5 year periods are regressed on three dummy variables
representing low, intermediate and high levels of trade union centralisation, plus the interactions
between the dummies and the Cukierman index of CBI. The results support the theoretical
predictions made by CL. A more detailed study is reported in Hall and Franzese (1998), who
regress in￿ ation on trade union centralisation, the unionisation rate, per capita income and
openness to trade. Regressions are estimated using cross-sectional averages, a stacked time
series in which in￿ ation is measured over 10 year intervals, and stacked time series for annual
data. The results show that union density, union centralisation and CBI are all statistically
signi￿cant and correctly signed. The signi￿cance of trade openness and per capita income is
more marginal, whilst the interaction term suggested by CL is insigni￿cant.
A number of criticisms have been levelled at the empirical literature on in￿ ation performance.
First, the estimated relationships could be driven by any time invariant e⁄ect that is relevant in
setting in￿ ation. For instance, Posen (1993) shows that the cross-sectional correlation between
CBI and in￿ ation disappears after controlling for a measure of ￿nancial sector opposition to
in￿ ation, though the sample considered is smaller than that used by Cukierman (1992). Second,
2Sachsida et al (2003) and Gruben and McLeod (2003) control for country e⁄ects in evaluating in￿ ation
performance, but focus on just one explanatory variable, trade openness.
6cross-sectional studies can prove sensitive to the period over which average in￿ ation rates are
measured, e.g. Bleaney (1999) shows that the strength of the evidence for a relationship between
openness and in￿ ation depends on whether the variables are measured over the 1970s, 1980s or
1990s. Third, many studies fail to control for the full range of variables suggested by economic
theory, or do not investigate the possible interactions between them.
3 A panel model for in￿ ation performance in the OECD
The analysis in this paper uses panel data on in￿ ation regimes in 20 countries over the period
1961-95.3 The time variation in this dataset allows us to test whether or not labour market in-
stitutions and indicators of in￿ ation aversion explain the changes in in￿ ation that have occurred
over time, as well as the cross-country di⁄erences in in￿ ation. In the econometric analysis the
full range of interaction e⁄ects suggested by economic theory are explored. We now describe
both the dataset and the econometric approach.
3.1 Data
The variables included in the dataset are de￿ned below. The methods and sources used in
constructing the data are described in the appendix.
￿ INFLATION is the annual rate of consumer price in￿ ation measured as a decimal (1%
in￿ ation is recorded as .01 in the dataset).
￿ CBI is an updated version of Cukierman￿ s (1992) index of the legal independence of central
banks, provided by van Lelyveld (2000). The range for this index is 0 ￿ 1, where 1 indicates
maximum possible independence. The updated index due to van Lelyveld shows greater time
variation than the original Cukierman index.
￿ OPEN is the nominal value of imports plus exports divided by the value of nominal GDP.
￿ GDP is the natural log of real GDP per capita, measured in terms of trade adjusted US$.
￿ TU is the union membership rate for employees, often referred to as trade union density.
The feasible range for this variable is 0 ￿ 1.4
￿ COORD is a direct measure of the degree of consensus between actors in collective bar-
gaining. The index lies in the range 1 ￿ 3, where 3 denotes the highest level of coordination.
This variable is closely related to the measure of centralization in union bargaining used by CL.
One advantage of COORD over the centralisation index is that it is available for a longer period
of time and at a higher frequency. Furthermore, as it aims to capture the degree of consensus
between ￿rms and unions in the labour market, it should provide a better measure of the extent
to which trade unions are likely to moderate wage claims in order to prevent episodes of high
in￿ ation.
3The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United
States
4The labour market variables for Germany refer to West Germany only. Note, however, that German uni￿ca-
tion a⁄ects only the last 5 years of the sample, 1991-95.
7￿ EP measures the strictness of employment protection legislation. It takes values in the
range 0 ￿ 2, where 2 is the highest possible level of employment protection.
In addition to the variables described in the text, Nickell et al (2002) provide data on the
generosity and duration of unemployment bene￿ts and on average tax rates. We do not consider
variables relating to the bene￿ts system because they may be endogenous to in￿ ation, e.g. high
in￿ ation may erode the real value of bene￿ts in the absence of full indexation. We have estimated
models that control for tax rates but the e⁄ects turned out insigni￿cant and are not reported.
In Figure 1 we plot average in￿ ation in the 20 countries in our sample against the corre-
sponding averages for TU, CBI, OPEN and GDP (the plots have been adjusted so that they
have comparable means and ranges and therefore we do not report units for the vertical axis).
An important feature of the series for TU is that it appears to be able to account for the upturn
in in￿ ation between the early 1960s and late 1970s as well as the reduction in in￿ ation from the
early 1980s onwards.
Figure 0 - see end of document.
3.2 Econometric methodology
In order to examine the determinants of in￿ ation performance we estimate regressions of the
following form:
INFit = ￿0 + ￿0
1x1;it + ￿0
2x2;it + ￿0
3hit + ￿i + ￿t + "it (8)
In this notation i refers to a country and t refers to a 5 year period. Thus, when t =
1 in the panel, each of the observations is an average over the ￿ve years 1961 ￿ 65. The
dependent variable, INF, is de￿ned as ln (1 + INFLATION). This transformation is used
because lnINFLATION can exaggerate the e⁄ect of very low in￿ ation countries. The vector
x1 comprises determinants of a country￿ s likely degree of in￿ ation aversion, x2 is a vector of
labour market institutions indicators, h is a vector of interactions among the ￿rst two sets of
variables, ￿i a country ￿xed e⁄ect, ￿t a time dummy and "it the error term.
In￿ ation is measured over 5 year periods because annual in￿ ation rates will depend on
macroeconomic shocks occurring in that year and need not re￿ ect the target in￿ ation rate
of the policy authority given the labour market structure that it faces (Ireland (1999) notes
that positive theories of in￿ ation do not explain high frequency movements in in￿ ation). This
approach to testing models of in￿ ation performance is well established in the literature, see for
instance Hall and Franzese (1998) and Gruben and McLeod (2003).
Note that when testing whether or not a variable xm2 interacts with a variable xn2 in setting
in￿ ation, we use the terms ￿m2 ￿ xm2 + ￿m3xm3 ￿ xn3 in the regression, and de￿ne xn2 so that it
has a zero mean. This ensures that the coe¢ cient on the level of xm2 can be interpreted as the
coe¢ cient of the "average" country, i.e. the country characterized by the average level of xm2.
In the results section a variable preceded by Z indicates that the variable is in zero mean form.
Equation (8) controls for country ￿xed e⁄ects (￿i) and common time e⁄ects (￿t). The
model is estimated using feasible GLS, allowing for groupwise heteroskedasticity and an AR(1)
8structure in the disturbances (a common error autocorrelation parameter is assumed for the 20
countries in the panel).
4 Empirical results
The ￿rst models that we estimate control for time dummies but not ￿xed e⁄ects and therefore
emphasise the cross-country variation in the data. In column (1) of Table 1 the explanatory
variables are CBI, OPEN multiplied by a dummy that is equal to 0 up until 1981-85 and equal
to 1 after that time (for each country), and GDP. Each of the variables is negatively signed and
signi￿cant, in line with the results from past research. In common with Gruben and McLeod
(2003) we ￿nd that openness is signi￿cant only in the post-1985 period. Entering openness in
column (1) without scaling by the dummy yields an insigni￿cant coe¢ cient estimate, results not
reported here.
In column (2) we consider the CL hypothesis that in￿ ation is hump shaped in trade union
centralisation provided that CBI is relatively low. COORD is closely related to the centrali-
sation index used by CL and is used in testing the hump shape hypothesis. In column (2) the
explanatory variables are ZCOORD, ZCOORD*ZCOORD and the interaction of those two vari-
ables with ZCBI. The CL hypothesis implies that ZCOORD*ZCOORD should be negatively
signed, ZCOORD*ZCBI positively signed and ZCOORD*ZCOORD*ZCBI negatively signed
(this combination of signs implies that the turning point for a graph of in￿ ation against ZCO-
ORD occurs further to the right). There is some support for these predictions, but only two of
the four parameters are signi￿cant at the 5% level. Further, when CBI, OPEN8695 and GDP
are added in column (3) the interaction terms become very insigni￿cant.5
In column (4) we add ￿xed e⁄ects to the column (1) speci￿cation. The variables CBI and
OPEN are much less signi￿cant, indicating that whilst these variables explain cross-country
di⁄erences in in￿ ation there is no evidence that they account for changes in in￿ ation within
countries. In column (5) we add ￿xed e⁄ects to the column (3) speci￿cation. The results
indicate some support for the GDP e⁄ect and the CL hypothesis.
Table 1 - see end of document.
Labour market institutions In Table 2 we consider a range of labour market variables.
The model in column (1) controls for time dummies, ￿xed e⁄ects and trade union density. The
coe¢ cient on the unionisation rate is positively signed and highly signi￿cant, supporting the
view that monopoly power in the labour market increases equilibrium in￿ ation. In column (2) we
add EP and COORD, but neither term is signi￿cant at the 5% level. In column (3) we interact
TU with ZCOORD and ZEP. It appears that higher levels of coordination between ￿rms and
unions moderate the in￿ ation increasing e⁄ect of more heavily unionised labour markets, while
higher levels of employment protection make the e⁄ect stronger, although the latter interaction
5Guzzo and Velasco (1999) show that in￿ ation is hump shaped in CBI and that the shape of the hump depends
on coordination in wage bargaining. We brie￿ y investigated this hypothesis but did not ￿nd any supporting
evidence - allowing for non-linearities in the relationship does not revive a CBI e⁄ect.
9is insigni￿cant at this stage. Column (4) shows that conditioning on labour market institutions
indicators does not restore the signi￿cance of CBI and OPEN (this does not change if we
replace OPEN with OPEN8695).6
In column (5) trade union density is interacted with zero mean versions of CBI, GDP and
OPEN, and in column (6) three triple interaction terms are added to the model. The interaction
between union density and income per capita is signi￿cant, but the other coe¢ cients are less
well determined. In column (7) we report a tested down version of equation (6), obtained
through deleting the least signi￿cant term, re-estimating the model and then repeating the
process until each term is signi￿cant at the 5% level. The results con￿rm the importance of
trade union density. The e⁄ect is stronger when levels of employment protection are above the
sample average and weaker when employment protection is below average. These ￿ndings are
consistent with the results in Nunziata (2004), who shows that high levels of union density and
employment protection increase real wages relative to productivity. This implies higher unit
costs, which may subsequently increase in￿ ation.
Central bank independence above the OECD average reduces the impact of trade union
density on in￿ ation. One interpretation is that trade unions are less likely to submit high wage
demands when the policy authority is tough because they anticipate a signi￿cant tightening
of monetary policy, which would drive unemployment to a level that unions cannot tolerate.
One example of this is the interaction between German trade unions and the Bundesbank, see
Soskice and Iversen (1998).
In column (7) an above average level of income per capita reduces the impact of union
density on in￿ ation. This may re￿ ect a tendency for unions to moderate pay claims when living
standards are relatively high. It is important to note that as per capita income is a trended
variable the e⁄ect of union density is stronger at the start of the sample than at the end. If we
replace the GDP per capita term with GDP per capita relative to the OECD average at that
time, which is not a trended variable, we obtain a coe¢ cient estimate for TU*ZGDP of ￿:065
(absolute t-ratio is 1:64) and a coe¢ cient on TU of :036 (absolute t-ratio is 1:71), and all of the
other regressors remain signi￿cant at the 5% level. If the GDP interaction is dropped from the
model then all of the regressors, including TU, are signi￿cant at the 5% level and the coe¢ cient
on TU is :040. One explanation for the robustness of the results after deleting a heavily trended
interaction term is that the time dummies, ￿t, control for its e⁄ects.
The column (7) results also indicate that a relatively high level of coordination between
￿rms and workers moderates the in￿ ationary impact of union density, but only in countries in
which OPEN exceeds the OECD average. This lends support to the hypothesis due to Rama
(1994), that union behaviour is less aggressive in open economy settings because international
competition raises the elasticity of labour demand and hence the unemployment cost of high
real wages.7 The interaction TU*ZCOORD was deleted during the model reduction process.
6Daniels, Nourzad and VanHoose (2003) argue that openness reduces in￿ ation by more in nations with less
centralised wage bargaining. The implied interaction term is not signi￿cant in models that control for ￿xed e⁄ects
and time dummies (results not reported here).
7It will be noted from equation (7) that a higher elasticity of labour demand can increase the pass-through
from the real wage premium to in￿ ation. The negative coe¢ cient on the three-way interaction term suggests
that this e⁄ect is dominated by the Rama e⁄ect, which says that trade unions increase the wage premium by less
10If it is added to model (7) the estimated coe¢ cient is negative, but the absolute t-ratio is just
0:91. The coe¢ cient on the three-way interaction TU*ZCOORD*ZOPEN remains signi￿cant
and has an absolute t-ratio of 2:47. Only if the latter term is excluded does TU*ZCOORD
become signi￿cant at the 5% level (absolute t-ratio of 2:49).
If the four variables suggested by the CL hump-shape hypothesis, ZCOORD, ZCOORD*ZCBI,
ZCOORD*ZCOORD and ZCOORD*ZCOORD*ZCBI, are added to column (7), each of them
is insigni￿cant.8 One explanation is that unionisation rates correlate with other forms of trade
union power, including centralisation. This is suggested in Chou (2000) and also in Daniels,
Nourzad and VanHoose (2003), who estimate a hump shape relation between union density and
in￿ ation, rather than union centralisation/coordination and in￿ ation. Testing for this hump
shape through adding the square of trade union density to model (7) in Table 2 yields a t-ratio
that is marginally insigni￿cant at the 5% level (all other variables remain signi￿cant). This
suggests that it is not large trade unions per se that cause wage pressures to be moderated, but
rather that large trade unions are found in countries in which central bank independence, trade
openness, per capita income and union-￿rm coordination are also relatively high, and that these
factors limit the positive e⁄ect of union density on in￿ ation.
Oil price shocks We now investigate the e⁄ects of oil price shocks. The term OIL mea-
sures the percentage change in the US$ spot price of a barrel of West Texas Intermediate. As
this variable takes the same values for each country it cannot be used in levels form, but it
can be added as an interaction term. In column (8) we add the terms OIL*ZCOORD and
OIL*ZCOORD*ZOPEN to the column (7) speci￿cation. Both e⁄ects are negatively signed and
signi￿cant. The ￿rst interaction suggests that greater coordination between ￿rms and unions
reduces the impact of oil price shocks on in￿ ation, possibly because corporatist arrangements
lead to movements in the labour share that accommodate adverse oil price shocks, see Bruno and
Sachs (1985), Chou (2001) and Nielsen and Bowdler (2003). The second interaction is included
because model (7) suggests that the e⁄ects of trade union coordination tend to be stronger in
more open economies.9
In column (9) we delete the time dummies from (8) and add OIL. The additional term
is highly signi￿cant. The other e⁄ects are generally robust, although the interaction between
union density and GDP loses signi￿cance following the deletion of the time dummies. The
robustness of the union density e⁄ect in model (9) casts some light on the direction of causation
in the estimated regressions. One potential objection to the results in columns (1)-(8) is that
the union density e⁄ect is endogenous in the sense that oil price shocks raise in￿ ation and also
cause workers to join trade unions in an e⁄ort to protect real incomes. The fact that union
density remains signi￿cant after controlling for oil price e⁄ects suggests that the extent of this
reverse causation bias is quite limited (in section 4.2 we address other sources of endogeneity).
We also considered the hypothesis due to Walsh (1997) that relatively high levels of CBI
when labour demand is relatively elastic.
8This is consistent with the evidence in Hall and Franzese (1998). The theoretical underpinnings for the CL
hypothesis have been questioned by Fracasso and Ozkan (2004) and Ciccarone and Marchetti (2002).
9Interactions between oil price in￿ ation and union density and oil price in￿ ation and employment protection
were investigated, but the estimated e⁄ects proved to be insigni￿cant.
11moderate the impact of oil price in￿ ation, but were unable to ￿nd any supporting evidence
(results not reported).
Stability across macroeconomic regimes Column (10) in Table 2 considers the stability
of the preferred speci￿cation (model (8)). It is often argued that the Bretton Woods ￿xed
exchange rate system in￿ uenced the behaviour of in￿ ation during the period through 1972. In
order to examine this possibility we estimate regression (8) for the sub-sample of observations
beginning in 1976 ￿ 1980. The results show that most of the estimated e⁄ects are robust,
although some of them are less well estimated. The CBI interaction loses signi￿cance. This
indicates that in the full sample the role of CBI is mainly due to events in the 1960s and early
1970s. An inspection of the data shows that CBI declined somewhat in Austria, France and the
UK during this period, possibly re￿ ecting the way in which governments instructed their central
banks to manage currency ￿ ows in supporting exchange rate targets (consider the experience of
the United Kingdom in 1967). These reductions in CBI appear to have ampli￿ed the in￿ ation
increasing e⁄ect of rising trade union density during the 1960s and 1970s, and therefore explain
a large part of the negative point estimate on TU*ZCBI in column (8).10
Table 2 - see end of document.
The quantitative signi￿cance of the results A hypothetical country that is exactly at
the OECD average in terms of EP, GDP, CBI, COORD and OPEN experiences an increase
in the annual in￿ ation rate of 0:68 percentage points following a 10 percentage point increase
in union density (using the column (8) results). This e⁄ect is very small, but it is important
to bear two points in mind. First, this is the e⁄ect observed after controlling for the common
global trends in in￿ ation and union density and is therefore a lower bound on the e⁄ect in which
we are interested (leaving aside the issue of estimation uncertainty). An upper bound may be
obtained by deleting the time dummies from column (8). This yields a coe¢ cient on union
density of 0:217, implying that a 10 percentage point increase in unionisation raises equilibrium
in￿ ation by approximately 2:2 percentage points. Second, changes in in￿ ation could be larger
still given a particular institutional con￿guration, e.g. high levels of employment protection and
low levels of CBI.
The next question that we address is whether or not the marginal e⁄ect of union density is
always positive, given the many negatively signed interaction terms that enter the models. In
Table 3 we list the coe¢ cient estimates from column (8) in Table 2 for terms in union density,
the standard deviations of the zero mean parts of those terms and the products of the coe¢ cient
estimates and the standard deviations. The main point is that after controlling for di⁄erences
in the variability of the interaction terms, it is clear that there is very little chance that the total
derivative of in￿ ation with respect to union density will turn negative for any of the countries
10During the sub-period commencing 1976-80 many European countries adopted ￿xed exchange rate regimes
as part of the European Monetary System (EMS). Excluding all of these countries would lead to a very small
sample and is not an option that we pursue here. Note that if EMS membership a⁄ects only the level of in￿ ation
then the country dummies will control for its e⁄ects.
12in the sample (only in the case of Switzerland is the total e⁄ect of union density approximately
zero).
Table 3 - see end of document.
4.1 Robustness and sensitivity
Figures 1 to 7 show plots of recursive coe¢ cient estimates for the preferred model (Table 2,
column 8) obtained by deleting one country at a time from the sample. The plots con￿rm the
stability of the coe¢ cients and suggest that the results are not driven by outlying observations
observed in one particular country. The t-ratio for TU ￿ ZCBI when Austria is excluded from
the sample is 1.44. Unionisation rates in Austria fell during the 1960s and early 1970s at a time
of rising in￿ ation. The fact that the independence of Austria￿ s central bank was being eroded at
the time helps to explain rising in￿ ation despite falling unionisation rates. This episode seems
to be important in driving the full sample estimate of the coe¢ cient on TU ￿ ZCBI.
The inclusion of Sweden in the sample is important in obtaining a precise estimate of the
coe¢ cient on the employment protection interaction, although the point estimate is robust to
dropping observations for Sweden. The coe¢ cient on the GDP interaction is less signi￿cant
when countries at the extremes of the income distribution are dropped, e.g. Denmark, Japan
and Portugal. On the whole, however, the estimated model is quite stable.
Figures 1-7 - see end of document.
Another check that we carried out involved dropping one variable at a time from the speci￿-
cation in Table 2, column (8). In most cases the variables that were left in the model remained
signi￿cant, suggesting that the core results are not dependent on over-￿tting bias (results not
reported).
We now consider whether or not the main results (column (8) in Table 2) are dependent on
the econometric approach that we have followed. In Table 4 we report the results obtained from
the following experiments:
￿ In column (1) we add an extra set of time observations to the model. These are formed
from three year averages for 1996 ￿ 98 (most of the series end in 1998). For Canada and Spain
the ￿nal observation for union density is a 1996￿97 average, while the observation for Belgium
is missing. Also, a measure of openness for Australia is unavailable for 1996 ￿ 98. The CBI
variable is unavailable post-1995. We assume that the observations for 1996 ￿ 98 are equal to
those for 1991￿95. This is a strong assumption, but it at least permits estimation of the model
using a larger sample.
￿ In column (2) we present a ￿xed e⁄ects plus time dummies speci￿cation estimated by OLS
and using White (1980) robust standard errors, rather than the feasible GLS method described
in section 3.
￿ In column (3) we generalise the static equations to include a lagged in￿ ation term. If the
e⁄ects that we estimate in Table 2 are spurious then we would not expect them to be robust to
the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. The dynamic model in (3) is ￿tted by OLS and
13does not control for ￿xed e⁄ects. The results obtained from such an estimation are inconsistent.
We present them here because it is known that they provide an upper bound on the true value
of the autoregressive parameter and can be used as a basis for comparisons with consistent
estimates.
￿ In column (4) we add ￿xed e⁄ects to the column (3) speci￿cation and again estimate
by OLS. The autoregressive parameter estimated for this model is biased downwards and will
represent a lower bound on the true value, see Blundell et al (2000).
￿ In column (5) we estimate the dynamic speci￿cation using the system generalised method
of moments estimator (GMM-SYS) due to Blundell and Bond (1998). The method involves
estimating the dynamic model in ￿rst di⁄erences and instrumenting all terms using lagged
levels, and estimating the relation in levels using lagged ￿rst di⁄erences as instruments. The
￿nal estimates are weighted averages of those from the two halves of the system. In choosing the
set of instruments to be used we treat the contemporaneous levels of each of the independent
variables as potentially endogenous and therefore use lagged levels dated t ￿ 2 (and earlier) as
instruments for the equation in ￿rst di⁄erences, and lagged di⁄erences dated t￿1 (and earlier)
as instruments for the equation in levels.11 The estimator deals with endogeneity concerns as
well as the presence of dynamics. The estimator is consistent as the cross-sectional dimension
of the panel goes to in￿nity. As we have just 20 countries in this application the results should
be treated with some caution.
The coe¢ cient on union density falls by one half when the sample is extended to 1998 and
the e⁄ect is actually insigni￿cant at the 5% level. The lack of signi￿cance is mainly due to
the loss of independent information in the estimation. The time dummy introduced for the
1996￿98 observations is highly insigni￿cant (p￿value = :76) and when it is deleted the union
density term becomes signi￿cant at the 5% level. Nevertheless, the results suggest that changes
in in￿ ation performance between 1991￿95 and 1996￿98 are less highly correlated with changes
in trade union density (though bear in mind the assumptions made in constructing the data).
The results based on OLS estimation are in line with those obtained by feasible GLS.
Columns (3) and (4) provide the OLS and within groups estimates of the dynamic panel model.
We do not assign any particular interpretation to these results in view of the fact that the estima-
tion is biased, though it is worth noting that the signs and signi￿cance of most of the variables
are preserved, albeit with large changes in the coe¢ cient estimates in some cases (especially
after taking into account the multiplier from the lagged dependent variable).
In column (5) we present the GMM-SYS estimates. The residual diagnostics show that the
application of the GMM estimator is valid. The Sargan test is based on the null hypothesis
that the over-identifying moment conditions are satis￿ed. Non-rejection of this hypothesis im-
plies that the corresponding elements of the instrument set are valid. The AR(1) and AR(2)
tests indicate that the model residuals are negatively correlated at the ￿rst order but uncorre-
lated at the second order. This is consistent with the assumption that the errors in the levels
in￿ ation equation are serially uncorrelated (these errors form a ￿rst order moving average in
11In the ￿rst di⁄erence equation there is a moving average error structure, such that the ￿rst valid instruments
are available at t ￿ 2 rather than t ￿ 1, even though it is only the t dated terms that are treated as endogenous.
14the di⁄erenced equation so that AR(1) e⁄ects are expected (the standard errors take this into
account)).
The results of the GMM estimation show that most of the e⁄ects estimated previously are
robust to controlling for the lagged dependent variable and potential endogeneity biases. The
estimated coe¢ cient on trade union density is very small at :027, but this rises to :05 after
multiplying by 1
1￿:463 in order to obtain the static solution to the model. This long-run e⁄ect
is not too far from the :068 estimated by feasible GLS, and is signi￿cant at the 5% level using
the standard errors for the static solution. The term TU ￿ ZCBI loses signi￿cance when the
model is ￿tted using GMM-SYS and is actually incorrectly signed. The reason appears to be
that lagged values of TU ￿ ZCBI are not good instruments because changes in CBI tend to
occur infrequently and suddenly rather than in a serially correlated fashion, so that there is only
a weak correlation between levels and ￿rst di⁄erences of the series. The other interaction terms
are all signi￿cant in the GMM-SYS estimate of the model. The static coe¢ cients multiplying
these terms are somewhat larger in absolute value than those reported in column (8) of Table
2, especially in the case of the oil price terms.
Table 4 - see end of document.
4.2 Further results
In this sub-section we consider variables for which we were able to collect data for only a subset
of the 20 countries included in the full sample. The variable LEFT measures the proportion of
cabinet seats ￿lled by left wing parties, while RIGHT measures the proportion taken by right
wing parties (the two variables are not collinear because some cabinet seats are taken by centrist
parties). Data are not available for Portugal and Spain.12 FOI is Posen￿ s (1993) measure of
￿nancial sector opposition to in￿ ation, FOI, which is available for 16 countries. It is not time-
varying and is therefore interacted with time-varying regressors rather than being used as a
separate levels term. HOME is Oswald￿ s (1996) measure of the proportion of households that
are owner occupiers. Oswald suggests that this variable is negatively related to geographical
labour mobility because home ownership increases the costs of worker relocation. The data
are collected at 10 year intervals and we assume that an observation for, say, 1960 applies for
the period 1960 ￿ 69. We then form the ￿ve year averages for the periods 1961 ￿ 65 through
1991 ￿ 95 that we require. This ensures that the data are smooth within groups. The series is
not available for Portugal.
In Table 5 we present the results obtained using these additional variables.13 In column
(1) we present the core speci￿cation from column (8) in Table 2 augmented with the levels of
LEFT and RIGHT and interactions between union density and zero mean versions of LEFT
and RIGHT. The results do not support the idea that left wing governments increase in￿ ation
relative to right wing governments, either directly, or through interactions with the unionisation
rate. In column (2) we ￿nd strong support for the hypothesis that higher levels of ￿nancial
12The ￿nal observation for each country is a 1991-94 average, not a 1991-95 average.
13The means of the interaction terms in labour market institutions, openness, CBI and GDP per head are not
quite zero in these regressions because of the reduction in the sample size.
15sector opposition to in￿ ation reduce the impact of union density on in￿ ation. The interaction
between union density and CBI remains signi￿cant in column (2), suggesting that conservative
￿nancial sector institutions not only prevent trade unions raising the in￿ ation rate through
lobbying the central bank, but also through other means such as lobbying governments not to
accommodate in￿ ationary pay claims. The interaction terms in employment protection and per
capita income lose signi￿cance in (2), but it is not clear whether this is due to the change in the
sample size or the inclusion of the additional regressor. Finally, in column (3) it is shown that
high levels of home ownership increase the impact of union density on in￿ ation, but the e⁄ect
is not signi￿cant at the 5% level.
Table 5 - see end of document.
5 Summary
This paper has analysed the determinants of in￿ ation performance in the OECD using panel
data models that control for ￿xed e⁄ects and time dummies. The main ￿ndings are ￿ve-fold.
First, higher unionisation rates are associated with higher in￿ ation. Second, the impact of
unionisation rates on in￿ ation is larger when employment legislation is strict relative to the
OECD average, possibly because the bargaining power of unions is increased so that they can
extract larger real wage premia. Third, the impact of unionisation rates on in￿ ation is smaller
when wage bargaining is highly coordinated, though only in countries that are more open to
international trade is the average OECD country. This is consistent with the hypothesis due
to Rama (1994) that large trade unions are more likely to moderate wage demands in open
economies because foreign competition increases the wage rate elasticity of labour demand.
Fourth, after controlling for ￿xed e⁄ects, CBI, trade openness and GDP per capita do not exert
signi￿cant e⁄ects on in￿ ation. Fifth, these variables do play a role in conditioning the impact of
unionisation rates on in￿ ation. Increased CBI may cause trade unions to be less aggressive in
wage negotiations because unions anticipate that high wage claims will elicit interest rate hikes.
Increased GDP per capita may reduce the impact of trade union density on in￿ ation because
unions are less militant when living standards are already at a relatively high level.
In extensions of our core results we showed that the main ￿ndings are generally robust to
varying the sample, both cross-sectionally and along the time dimension. Similarly, most of
the estimated e⁄ects proved to be robust to estimating a dynamic version of the model using a
GMM technique (the interaction between union density and central bank independence proved
least robust).
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18Appendix: Data Sources
INFLATION. The data were extracted from the OECD annual national accounts, except
in the case of Denmark and the Netherlands, for which the source is the International Financial
Statistics database maintained by the International Monetary Fund.
CBI. The index is obtained by aggregating indicator variables that describe the conditions
under which central banks extend loans to the government, the terms of reference for central
bank governors and other relevant aspects of central bank operations. The index is due to
Cukierman (1992) and refers to the period 1950 ￿ 89. The version that we use in this paper is
updated to describe changes in central bank independence up to 1994, and is described in van
Lelyveld (2000). Updated measures of central bank independence are not provided for Portugal.
We use the Cukierman (1992) data for Portugal.
OPEN. The data were extracted from Penn World Tables. German data for the pre-
uni￿cation period are not available via the Penn World Tables. We obtained the relevant data
from the International Financial Statistics database and then spliced this to the 1990s data for
Germany in order to obtain a consistent series.
GDP. The source for these data is the Penn World Tables. In the case of Germany we
take International Financial Statistics data on nominal German GDP in DM and convert it
to US$ using a centred 11 year moving average of the actual $-DM exchange rate. This series
is then divided by the US price level and German population to give real per capita GDP in
US$. Finally, this series is spliced to the Penn series for 1990-98 to give the data that we use
for German GDP.
EP. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) provide an index of employment protection at the 5 year
frequency. We use an interpolated version of this series, readjusted in mean.
TU. This is the ratio of employed union members to total employees. For European countries
other than Sweden the source is Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000). For the other countries the
sources are Visser (1996) and Huber et al (1997). The latter series are updated by Nunziata
(2003).
COORD. This variable is obtained by interpolating OECD data on bargaining coordination.
19Figure 0: Cross-country averages for INF, TU, CBI, OPEN and GDP, 1961-95.
20Figure 1: Stability of coe¢ cients in preferred model: TU
Figure 2: Stability of coe¢ cients in preferred model: TU*ZEP
21Figure 3: Stability of coe¢ cients in preferred model: TU*ZCBI
Figure 4: Stability of coe¢ cients in preferred model: TU*ZGDP
Figure 5: Stability of coe¢ cients in preferred model: TU*ZCOORD*ZOPEN
22Figure 6: Stability of coe¢ cients in preferred model: OIL*ZCOORD
Figure 7: Stability of coe¢ cients in preferred model: OIL*ZCOORD*ZOPEN
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